Abstract-Furthering the study of cryptography in constant parallel time, we give new evidence for the security of Goldreich's candidate pseudorandom generator with near-optimal, polynomial stretch. Our evidence consists both of security against subexponential-time linear attacks as well as subexponential-time attacks using SDP hierarchies such as Sherali-Adams+ and Lasserre/Parrilo. More specifically, instantiating Goldreich's generator with the 5-ary "Tri-Sum-And" predicate, we get a candidate 5-local PRG which is secure against both linear attacks and attacks based on the Lasserre/Parrilo SDP hierarchy. Previous works with such small locality gave polynomially less stretch and were only shown to be secure against linear attacks. Our result is essentially optimal, as known SDP/spectral techniques show the generator would not be secure if its stretch was higher by any polynomial factor.
I. INTRODUCTION
A major goal of cryptography is the construction of very efficient, secure cryptographic primitives; e.g., one-way functions (OWFs) or pseudorandom generators (PRGs). One interpretation of "very efficient" -suggested as early as the mid-'80s [1] -is "highly parallelizable" or "in NC 1 ". An even more ambitious goal, suggested in works by Goldreich [2] and by Cryan and Miltersen [3] from the early 2000's, is that of cryptography in NC 0 . By this is meant the possibility of, say, PRGs f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m (m > n) with constant locality. We say that f is k-local if each output bit f (x) j depends on at most k input bits x i .
A celebrated work of Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [4] showed that under standard cryptographic assumptions (e.g., hardness of factoring or lattice problems) there are secure PRGs f : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1} m computable in NC 0 with locality as small as 4. Unfortunately, the PRGs they construct have only sublinear stretch; i.e., m ≤ n + o(n). This deficiency is inherent in the [4] methodology, and in fact it's known [5] that a 4-local PRG can achieve stretch at best O(n). On the other hand, it would be quite desirable to have a cryptographically secure PRG with constant locality and polynomial stretch; i.e., m = n 1+ for a positive constant . An example application would be secure two-party computation with only constant overhead [6] .
Goldreich's generator.: The main candidate for such a constant-locality, polynomial-stretch PRG was proposed by Goldreich [2] ; see also [7] . Goldreich's suggestion was the following (for more precise details, see Section II): To construct a potential k-local OWF/PRG mapping n bits to m ≥ n bits, first fix a Boolean predicate P : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} and also fix once and for all a list S 1 , . . . , S m ∈ [n] k of randomly chosen k-tuples. (Alternatively, it may be enough that the associated n-vertex, m-edge, k-uniform hypergraph be a sufficiently good expander.) Then on input x ∈ {0, 1} n , the jth output bit of the generator is defined to be P applied to the S j bits of x. It's also fruitful to think of the output of this generator as a random "planted instance" of the k-CSP (constraint satisfaction problem) with constraint predicate P . There is one twist to this CSP viewpoint, though: rather than a traditional CSP instance specifying m satisfied constraints, the output of Goldreich's generator should be viewed as a list of m constraints together with a 0/1 "right-hand side" specifying whether or not the constraint is satisfied. (Alternatively, this can be viewed as a CSP with both P and ¬P constraints.) Roughly speaking, the generator is a OWF if these random planted CSP instances are hard to solve, and it's a PRG if these random planted CSP instances are hard to distinguish from completely random instances (i.e., where the right-hand sides are uniformly random).
Naturally, the security of Goldreich's candidate PRG depends on the predicate P as well as the stretch m. A number of negative results are known; for example, if P is an F 2 -linear function (i.e., an XOR predicate) then we don't even get a OWF for any m, since one can efficiently invert a system of F 2 -linear equations.
Further negative results are reviewed in Section II-I, but the most important one to mention is that if P fails to be "t-wise independent" -equivalently, if P has a nonzero Fourier coefficient of degree at most t -then Goldreich's PRG is not secure when m = Θ(n t/2 ). These negative results imply that if we want a k-local PRG with superlinear stretch we'll need a non-linear predicate P of arity k ≥ 5 which is at least 3-wise independent. There is essentially only one such predicate with k = 5, which we call "TSA" (standing for "Tri-Sum-And", the name given to the predicate in the inapproximability work [8] ): TSA(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 ) = x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 x 5 (mod 2).
Positive evidence.: It is plausible that Goldreich's generator, instantiated with TSA, is a 5-local PRG with stretch m = O(n 1.499 ). In this paper we present multiple forms of evidence supporting this possibility. Before stating our results, we briefly review some previous work supporting the security of Goldreich's generator. In 2003, Mossel, Shpilka, and Trevisan [5] showed that a variant of Goldreich's generator (using a not-completely-random 5-uniform hypergraph), when instantiated with the TSA predicate and m = O(n 1.249 ), strongly fools all F 2 -linear tests. More precisely, it's an " -biased generator" with = 2
−n Ω(1) . This gives some evidence of security, with a stretch which is polynomial but short of the potential O(n 1.499 ). Recent work of Applebaum, Bogdanov, and Rosen [9] extended this result to hold for all so-called "non-degenerate" predicates P , even for purely random k-uniform hypergraphs.
The property of -biasedness is only one necessary condition for PRGs. In the context of "CSP-like" PRGs it's natural to investigate attacks involving traditional algorithmic methods for CSPs. Cook, Etesami, Miller, and Trevisan [10] (building on [11] ) showed that a family of "myopic backtracking" (DPLL-like) algorithms requires exponential time to invert the TSA-based generator when m = n. It should be mentioned that these sorts of algorithms also fail when the predicate P is purely F 2 -linear, even though Goldreich's generator is easy to break in this case.
Finally, we mention that Applebaum has recently shown [12] using standard cryptographic techniques that if Goldreich's generator with TSA is indeed a PRG (or even a OWF) with stretch even n 1.01 , then for every b, c > 1 there exist PRGs with stretch n c , distinguishing probability 1/n b , and locality b O(log c) . Unfortunately, this locality is rather large: in practice, the O(·) hides an infeasibly large constant, and in theory, getting negligible distinguishing probability requires super-constant locality.
A. Our results
In this work we give evidence showing that Goldreich's generator, when instantiated with a (t − 1)-wise independent predicate P , may be secure with polynomial stretch almost as large as the known barrier: m = O(n t/2−δ ) for any δ > 0. In this section we will give informal statements of our results; more precise statements will appear in the sections that follow.
Let's begin with the particular case of P = TSA. Improving on the results in [5] , [9] , we show:
The amount of stretch in this theorem is essentially optimal, as it is known (see Theorem II.11) that Goldreich's generator cannot be cryptographically secure with a 5-local predicate for m = Θ(n 3/2 ), due to the existence of an attack based on SDP/spectral methods.
As mentioned, being -biased (i.e., secure against F 2 -linear combinations of output bits) is only one very particular requirement for a cryptographic PRG. Especially for Goldreich's "CSP-like" construction, more strong evidence for the PRG's security would come from the failure of "traditional algorithmic tools for CSPs". We propose semidefinite programming (SDP) hierarchies as a natural and powerful class of algorithmic attacks to rule out. Briefly, we will be considering the "basic" SDP hierarchy known as SheraliAdams + (SA + ) [13] , [14] , [15] , as well as the extremely powerful Lasserre/Parrilo/Sum-of-Squares SDP hierarchy [16] , [17] . (For more details, see Section II.) Both of these hierarchies are parameterized by a "rounds/degree" parameter r ∈ N; as r increases we get stronger and stronger SDPs but the running time increases as n O(r) . Considering SDP-based attacks on Goldreich's PRG is very natural, due to their strength in solving CSPs. For example, the SA + hierarchy is known to encapsulate many "local" CSP algorithms such as the "kconsistency" algorithm. In particular, constantly many rounds of SA + are known to decide satisfiability of any "bounded width" CSP [18] (even "robustly" [19] ). They are also known to decide satisfiability of any CSP instance whose primal instance has constant treewidth [20] . Raghavendra's deep theory of CSPs [21] also shows that SA + gives essentially the optimal approximation algorithm for all CSPs assuming the Unique-Games Conjecture. The Lasserre/Parrilo hierarchy is known to be even more powerful (see, e.g., [22] ), with constantly many rounds sufficing to well-solve all known instances of the Unique-Games problem itself. Particularly relevant to the cryptographic considerations in this paper is the following fact: the attack showing that Goldreich's PRG is not secure for m = Θ(n t/2 ) if P is not t-wise independent relies on an SDP/spectral algorithm (implementable with SA + ). The only deficiency of SDP hierarchies in the context of CSPs seems to be that they are fooled by purely linear predicates; i.e., they cannot simulate Gaussian elimination.
In light of the power of SDP algorithms in the context of CSPs, the following result of ours may be considered good evidence in favor of the security of Goldreich Finally, we can significantly strengthen Theorem I.2 for TSA and for a large family of TSA-like predicates. For these predicates we can get near-optimal stretch with perfect security against the much stronger Lasserre/Parrilo SDP hierarchy, simply by using a kpartite random hypergraph structure. The following theorem was jointly observed by the authors together with Boaz Barak, Siu On Chan, and Li-Yang Tan:
, and a random n-vertex medge, k-partite hypergraph, then it is perfectly secure against attacks based on computing the Lasserre/Parrilo relaxation value, even for n Ω(δ) rounds.
We remark that it is a seemingly very difficult question to obtain this result, even for P = TSA, when the random k-partite hypergraph is replaced simply with a random k-uniform hypergraph. On the other hand, for practical cryptographic purposes there seems to be no reason not to use a k-partite hypergraph structure for the PRG; in particular, our Theorem I.1 continues to hold in this setting (and in fact is slightly easier to prove).
B. Organization
In Section II, we give some definitions and background. We prove Theorem I.1 in Section III, Theorem I.2 in Section IV, and Theorem I.3 in Section V.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES

A. Distributions on graphs and hypergraphs
We will consider uniform distributions on the following sets of graphs and hypergraphs. In all cases we consider both the edge set and the individual edges to be ordered.
• 
).
We will denote the instance of Goldreich's generator associated with hypergraph H and predicate P as f H,P . We will also consider constructing f : {0,
Step 1. In addition, we will consider allowing H to be semirandom, in the sense that we will allow alterations to be made to H in polynomial time.
C. Properties of predicates
Two properties of a predicate, independence and algebraic degree, affect the security of its corresponding PRG.
Recall that any P : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} can be expressed as a unique multilinear polynomial over F 
D. The TSA predicate and generalizations
We define the 5-ary predicate TSA(
Observe that the TSA predicate is 2-wise independent and has F 2 degree 2. In addition, we will consider the following generalization of TSA:
This predicate is (t − 1)-wise independent and has F 2 degree u.
E. Security of PRGs
In general, we call a PRG secure if no algorithm can clearly distinguish its output from a uniform random string:
m is -secure if for any efficient algorithm A, the distinguishing advantage
Showing that a function satisfies this condition for every algorithm is hard, so we restrict our attention to studying the security of Goldreich's PRG against two particular classes of algorithms: F 2 -linear tests and SDPs.
F. F 2 -Linear Tests
F 2 -linear tests have been widely studied as attacks on PRGs [3] , [5] , [9] . In this case, A is of the form
, where the sum is taken mod 2.
Following [9] , define bias(f, L) as
with size(L) = |S| and
G. Distinguishers for Goldreich's function based on SDPs
SDPs can also be used as distinguishers for
for some x, the CSP has value 1. However, it is well-known (e.g., [23] ) that only a
fraction of constraints can be satisfied for a uniformly random y with high probability. If for y chosen uniformly at random, an SDP relaxation still returns value 1, i.e., believes that all constraints can be satisfied, then this f H,P is perfectly secure against attacks based on computing the value of this SDP. Many known attacks against Goldreich's generator use SDPs (see Section II-I). We consider the following two SDP hierarchies:
1) The Sherali-Adams
+ hierarchy: The SheraliAdams + hierarchy, denoted SA + , gives probability distributions on assignments to small sets of variables that are consistent on their intersections. Formally, let μ S be a distribution over {0, 1}
S and let {μ S } be a family of such distributions. For T ⊆ S and an assignment α ∈ {0, 1} S , we denote by α| T the assignment induced by α on T .
The Sherali-Adams LP hierarchy requires solutions to form a family of locally consistent distributions {μ S }. For t rounds of the hierarchy, any solution must be a t-locally consistent distribution. In the SA + hierarchy, we additionally require that there exist vectors
2) The Lasserre hierarchy: The Lasserre hierarchy is a powerful class of SDPs for solving polynomial optimization problems. We define it as in [22] , [24] .
Consider a polynomial optimization problem of the form
where p and the q i 's are polynomials. Let R[X] d be the set of polynomials in X over R of degree at most d. We call a polynomial s a sum of squares (SOS) if it can be expressed as the sum of squares of some polynomials. The degree-d Lasserre relaxation for (1) is then
H. Expansion and boundary expansion
To show security against SDP hierarchies, we will also require the notions of expansion and boundary expansion used in [23] and [25] . For a hypergraph H = (V, E) and a set of hyperedges S ⊆ E, we will define Γ(S) to be the set of all vertices contained in a hyperedge of S, i.e., Γ(S) = e∈S e. We will define ∂S = {v ∈ V : |Γ(v) ∩ S| = 1} to be the boundary vertices of S. Now we can define expansion and boundary expansion: Definition II.5. A hypergraph is (r, e)-expanding if for any set of hyperedges S such that |S| ≤ r, |Γ(S)| ≥ e|S|. A hypergraph is (r, e)-boundary expanding if for any set of hyperedges S such that |S| ≤ r, |∂S| ≥ e|S|.
It is well known that high expansion implies high boundary expansion (see e.g., [23] , [25] ):
In order to prove security against SDP hierarchies, we will need H − S to have high expansion for sets S such that |S| ≤ r for some r. This is not true in general, but [26] , [23] , [25] give an algorithm for finding a superset S of S such thatS is not too much bigger than S and H −S has high expansion: 
We will callS the closure of S.
I. Known limitations of the Goldreich generator
Herein we review the two known limitations of the Goldreich generator. (An overview for this material appears in Applebaum's survey from TCC 2013 [27] .)
The first limitation is a simple one appearing in the work of Mossel, Shpilka, and Trevisan:
This is simply because there will be an F 2 -linear relation among the output bits (by a dimension argument) and thus the generator will be susceptible to an F 2 -linear attack. The second limitation is somewhat more sophisticated:
Theorem II.9. Let t ≥ 2 and suppose the predicate P is not t-wise independent -i.e., P has nonzero correlation with some parity of at most t coordinates.
m is a random local function constructed from P with m ≥ Cn t/2 log n for sufficiently large C, then with high probability f G,P can be efficiently inverted; i.e., f G,P is not even a OWF. This theorem is apparently recent "folklore", known to some experts [28]; however it does not appear to be universally known and has never appeared in print. Therefore we give a sketch of the proof below. Before doing so, we review some variants and consequences of this theorem.
The idea behind the theorem dates back to [5] ; they showed the theorem with the weaker bound of m ≤ O(n t ), using an F 2 -linear attack. They further pointed out that if P has sufficiently large correlation with a size-2 parity then there is a "correlation attack" based on semidefinite programming which limits the stretch to m = O(n). This idea was extended by Bogdanov and Qiao [29] who showed that if P has any nontrivial correlation with a size-2 parity then Goldreich's generator is not even a OWF unless m ≤ O(n). Mossel, Shpilka, and Trevisan also combined their weaker version of Theorem II.9 with Proposition II.8 and Siegenthaler's Theorem to deduce that the maximum secure stretch of any k-ary predicate P is at most O(n k/2 ). Siegenthaler's Theorem is the following:
Using the stronger Theorem II.9 we can similarly deduce the following:
A classical example of a function showing Siegenthaler's Theorem is sharp is P = XORAND t,k−t . It's plausible that with t = 2 3 k this function may reach the limit given in Theorem II.11; see Section VI for more discussion.
We conclude this section by sketching the proof of Theorem II.9.
Proof: (Sketch.) By assumption, P (T ) = 0 for some T ⊆ [k] with |T | ≤ t; without loss of generality we may assume |T | = t ≥ 2. Let = P (T ) = 0; we may assume that > 0 without loss of generality (by negating P ). In fact, since P is a function of k coordinates we must have
we have that for a randomly chosen x ∈ {0, 1} n ,
here we are using the notation XOR T (x) = i∈T x i (mod 2). Let f (x) j be the jth output bit of f G,P and let T j be the ordered subset of S j corresponding to T . We may now state the algorithm for inverting f G,P ; it is reminiscent both of the Bogdanov-Qiao algorithm and the Feige-Ofek noisy 3-LIN algorithm [31] 
Solve the resulting 2-LIN instance to obtain an inverse for f G,P . We first observe that the t-LIN instance constructed in
Step 1 can be thought of as a δ-noisy random planted t-LIN instance, wherein one first generates a planted, fully satisfiable t-LIN instance and then flips each "righthand side" independently with probability δ = (cf. (2)).
Next, a simple estimate shows that the 2-LIN instance constructed in Steps 2 and 3 has many equations:
Claim II.12. In a random t-LIN instance with m = Ω(n t 2 log n) clauses, with high probability there are Ω(n log n) pairs of constraints that share the same first t − 1 coordinates.
Proof: This is a simple extension of the proof of Lemma 3.1 in [31] .
In addition, we can also think of this 2-LIN instance as being a δ -noisy random planted instance with the right-hand side bits flipped independently. The righthand side bit is flipped if exactly one of the right-hand side bits of the corresponding two t-LIN equations is flipped. This occurs with probability δ ≤ Proof: Imagine constructing a 2-LIN instance by the following equivalent process: Choose the first t − 1 variables of every equation uniformly at random. For each matched pair, independently choose the last two variables of this pair. This process is equivalent to the one described above and demonstrates that the 2-LIN equations are chosen independently. By symmetry, these equations are chosen uniformly at random. Therefore, every equation is chosen independently and uniformly at random.
So we have a random δ -noisy planted 2-LIN instance, where the noise δ is bound away from −2k . Håstad [32] , [33] showed that in this setting for O k (n log n) equations the planted solution and its complement are the only optimal solutions. Noisy 2-LIN instances can be solved using the methods of Bogdanov and Qiao [29] or Boppana [35] , so we can get an inverse for f G,P .
III. SECURITY AGAINST F 2 -LINEAR ATTACKS
In this section, we will prove the following theorem:
with high probability.
We prove the uniform case; the proof in the 5-partite case is almost identical.
A. Outline of the proof
Think of a linear test L as a degree 2 polynomial over F 2 , the sum of its constituent TSA functions. We will refer to this polynomial as L(x). Note that each TSA predicate is the mod 2 sum of an XOR part (x 1 +x 2 +x 3 ) and an AND part (x 4 · x 5 ). L(x) will have degree 1 terms corresponding to the sum of the XOR parts of its predicates and degree 2 terms corresponding to the AND parts.
Recall that the bias of a sum of constant-bias independent bits is exponentially small in the number of bits. This implies that if L can be divided up into enough "independent" pieces, it will have small bias. On the other hand, if L has degree-1 terms that are "independent" of the degree-2 terms, it will have bias 0. This means that in order for L to have large bias both of the following conditions must hold:
1) The AND parts cannot be broken up into a large number of mostly independent blocks. 2) The XOR parts must be highly dependent on each other and the AND parts. We show that it is very unlikely for both of these conditions to hold simultaneously, so L must have small bias with high probability. Previous analyses (e.g., [5] , [9] ) considered these conditions individually, showing that the AND parts are likely to consist of a large number of mostly independent blocks for large linear tests and that for small linear tests there are likely to be nonzero XOR terms that are independent of the AND terms. However, for higher values of m, it is likely that there will be medium size tests failing to meet either condition. We address this issue by showing that the probability that a linear test fails to meet both conditions simultaneously is low even though either condition individually might not hold.
The proof will have four sections. First, we will formalize conditions 1 and 2. Next, we will bound the probability that condition 1 is met, and then we will bound the probability that condition 2 is met. Using these bounds, we will show that the probability that condition 1 and condition 2 both occur is very small.
B. When do linear tests have large bias?
The starting point for our analysis is the work of [9] , who proved the following theorem (a combination of The proof follows the intuition described above. [9] only prove this theorem in the uniform case but their proof also works in the 5-partite case.
We therefore only need to show that
To do this, we will use the structure of the polynomial corresponding to the linear test. Specifically, we will need the following theorem. See, e.g, [36] for more details. 
Theorem III.3 (Dickson's Theorem). Any polynomial
p : F n 2 → F 2 of degree at most 2 can be expressed as p(x) = 0 (x) + h i=1 i (x) i (x),
Given a k-uniform hypergraph H, we can then write a linear test
linearly dependent, or L-LD, if 0 is linearly dependent on the i 's and i 's. Using the above conditions and the union bound, we say that β k is at most
Note that in the 5-partite case, we don't need to condition on rk(L) < n δ in the last term because the variables in the XOR and AND parts of the predicate are independent. We will show that β k ≤ 1 n 2 for all k in n 2δ , n 4 . In the next two sections, we will upper bound Pr H rk H (L) < n δ and
C. Low rank is unlikely
Let H AND be the graph on the variables of the instance constructed by putting an edge between two variables if and only if they both appear as AND variables in the same hyperedge. Let H AND (L) be the subgraph of H AND corresponding to the hyperedges of L. Note that each i i product is a complete bipartite subgraph of H AND (L). If rk(L) < n δ , there is a covering of H AND (L) with at most n δ complete bipartite graphs. We will show that this event is unlikely to happen. Ideally, we would simply show that Pr H rk H (L) < n δ is small. However, we are first going to have to exclude some "bad" cases that would complicate the analysis.
Consider a complete bipartite graph K s,t such that s ≤ t. First, we are going to show that it is very unlikely for H AND to contain any K s,t with s, t ≥ 5 as a subgraph. It is therefore also unlikely for any H AND (L) to contain any K s,t with s, t ≥ 5 as a subgraph. We will then restrict our attention to coverings of H AND (L) with K si,ti 's such that s i ≤ 4 and bound the probability that there is a covering of this form of size at most n δ . Note that this is the same as saying that we can write Next, we show that it is unlikely for H AND (L) to have a small covering of K si,ti 's with all s i ≤ 4 for all i.
Lemma III.5. For any size k linear test L,
Pr H rk < n δ | no K 5,5 ≤ e 2 8 k n 4n δ −k(1−δ) .
Proof:
In order for H AND (L) to a have a small covering of K si,ti 's such that all s i ≤ 4, there must be a small set of vertices that has many edges adjacent to it. We will bound the probability that such a set exists.
Let C i be the smaller of the two sets of vertices of K si,ti . We need only consider coverings of H AND with at most The number of edges adjacent to some vertex in C is at most 4n 1+δ . The total number of possible edges is n 2 and each edge is chosen uniformly at random since H AND is distributed like G(n, m), so
Summing over all possibles sets C, we can show that
D. Linear dependence is unlikely
In this section, we will bound the probability that 0 is linearly dependent on the i 's and i 's. Call H Ldense if rk H (L) < n δ and K 5,5 ⊆ H AND . Specifically, we will prove the following lemma:
Proof:
Then by the union bound,
Since there are at most 2 2h ≤ 2 2n δ subsets of U , it suffices to show that for any u ∈ {0, 1} n ,
To prove this, we need to determine how conditioning on the rank affects the XOR parts. Define
Now observe that the rank of L as well as whether or not H AND contains K 5,5 as a subgraph is completely determined by H AND , so this is equal to
As a result, it suffices to prove this claim:
It will be convenient for us to think of the process of drawing H ∼ H(n, m, k) in an equivalent sequential way: For i from 1 to m, pick an ordered subset of size k from [n] uniformly at random to be the ith hyperedge of H. For each ordered hyperedge, we pick the first variable uniformly at random from [n]. We then pick the second variable uniformly at random from the remaining n − 1 variables and continue in this manner for the remaining three variables.
Recall that 0 is the sum of the XOR parts of all hyperedges of L. Think of the process of constructing the XOR parts of L as filling in 3k blanks with variables. Let s be the size of the support of u. In order for 0 = u, we need s of these 3k blanks to be the variables in the support of u. Define E T to be the event that a specific set T of s blanks contains the variables of u. The remaining 3k − s blanks must be filled with pairs of variables that add to 0. Define the event F T to be the event that all blanks not in T are filled with matching pairs of variables. We can then write
First, we will bound Pr H [E T ]. There are s! possible orderings in which we could fill in the blanks of T with the elements of u. For each of these orderings, we need to bound the probability that all s blanks are assigned correctly. The probability that a single blank is filled in with a particular variable x is at most 1 n−4 : We have already set the two AND variables for this hyperedge and have set at most two XOR variables, so the blank is filled in by choosing a variable uniformly at random from at least n − 4 unused choices. The probability that all s blanks are filled in correctly is then at most 
E. Putting the pieces together
Now we will combine the results of the previous two sections to complete the proof of Theorem III.1. By conditioning, we know that
where
and L is some linear test of size k. In the uniform case, we can plug in the results of Lemmas III.4, III.5, and III.6 and then simplify using 
A. Outline of the proof
Recall that in order to show that Goldreich's PRG is secure against attacks based on computing the SA + value, we need to prove that the SA + relaxation of the CSP f H,P (x) = y has a solution with value 1 for a random string in y ∈ {0, 1} m with high probability over H. To do this, we need to give consistent local distributions on satisfying assignments and vectors whose dot products match the probabilities of pairs of assignments from these distributions. Note that in this section we will only consider H drawn from H(n, m, k).
The first two parts of the proof very closely follow the analysis of [23], whose results we generalize for higher values of m and general t. We start by showing that random k-uniform hypergraphs have high expansion. We then show that high expansion suffices to guarantee the existance of locally-consistent distributions supported on satisfying assignments. In [23] , the existance of SA + vectors relies on assignments to pairs of variables being uniformly distributed. This follows from the fact that the hypergraph corresponding to the instance still has high expansion, even when any two vertices are deleted. This property no longer holds for higher values of m; it is likely that there are small sets of hyperedges that do not have sufficiently high expansion. However, we can instead show that there are only o(m) of these sets. We can then simply remove these hyperedges to get a hypergraph that does have the expansion property we want, allowing us to construct SA + vectors.
B. Random instances are well-behaved
First, we restate the well-known fact that random kuniform hypergraphs have high expansion (e.g., [23] , [25] ).
The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of Lemma 4.1 in [23] .
Note that this lemma with Lemma II.6 implies that
C. Obtaining consistent distributions
In this section, we will use the high expansion of a random instance to construct a family of locally consistent distributions. We will then use these locally consistent distributions to show that the SA + relaxation has value 1.
For a set of variables S, let C(S) be the set of hyperedges (constraints for the corresponding CSP) of H completely contained in S. As in [23] and [25] , we define the distribution μ S over assignments {0, 1}
S to be the uniform distribution over assignments satisfying all constraints in C(S). This means that μ S (α) > 0 only if α satisfies all constraints in C(S).
[23] show that that this distribution is locally consistent when the hypergraph still has large boundary expansion even after removing a set. It is easy to extend their results to (t − 1)-independent predicates: Lemma IV.2. Let S 1 ⊆ S 2 be two sets of variables such that both H and H − S 1 are (r, k − t + )-boundary expanding for some > 0 and |C(S 2 )| ≤ r. Then for any α 1 ∈ {0, 1} S1 , the marginal of μ S2 on S 1 is equal to μ S1 , i.e., α2∈{0,1}
This can be proved in exactly the same manner as [23] Lemma 3.2.
Note that H − S doesn't always have high boundary expansion. However, for any set S of size at most O k,δ (n δ/(t−2) ), we can calculate a closure setS for We then consider the family of distributions μ defined so that μ S is the restriction to S of the uniform distribution over satisfying assignments to the constraints in C(S); see [23] 
In this section, we will give a sufficient condition from [23] for the existence of these vectors. Specifically, this paper shows that if μ distributions are uniform on assignments to every pair of variables, then we can find vectors v satisfying the above condition. If the hypergraph has high enough expansion, the μ distributions are uniform as desired.
We now fill in the details. Consider the matrix M ∈
To obtain vectors satisfying the above condition, it suffices to show the M is positive semidefinite (PSD). The Cholesky decomposition of M then produces vectors
Now consider the following matrix M : This means that if M were equal to M , we would be done. Unfortunately, this is not quite true. We now need to address the existence of constant size sets S that have too few boundary variables. Note that if for every i, j and every subset of vertices S of
then H − {i, j} would be (n Ω(δ) , k − t + )-boundary expanding for some > 0, M = M and we would be done. We will show that with high probability there are a sublinear number of hyperedges violating (3). We can then delete all of them to obtain a new hypergraph H for which M = M and that still has Ω n t/2−δ hyperedges. This implies that the number of hyperedges participating in at least one of these small, low-expansion sets is o(m). We can find and delete all such edges in time n O(1/δ) . This gives us a new hypergraph H with m = Ω(n t/2−δ ) hyperedges for which f H ,P is secure against attacks based on computing the SA + relaxation value. This completes the proof of Theorem I.2.
E. There are few bad hyperedges
Remark IV.7. Observe that these semirandom instances H are also secure against linear tests when P = TSA by the analysis of Section III: Every linear test that can be applied to f H ,TSA can also be applied to f H,TSA , as we have only deleted hyperedges.
V. SECURITY AGAINST Proof: Note that Schoenebeck [37] has proven precisely this theorem in the case that k = t; i.e., when P is simply the t-ary XOR predicate. 1 In particular, one can view his proof as constructing an appropriate "pseudoexpectation" operator E[·] (see [22] ) for degree2r polynomials under which all t-XOR constraints are satisfied with "pseudoprobability 1".
In our more general setting we can easily obtain the required pseudoexpectation operator by a black-box reduction. The pseudoexpectation operator can simply "deterministically commit" to an arbitrary fixed setting of the variables x j i for t < j ≤ k -say, all-1's. This requires us to produce an appropriate pseudoexpectation operator for the resulting t-XOR system (with new jth right-hand side equal to b j = b j + Q(1, . . . , 1) (mod 2)); but Schoenebeck's theorem gives us one for any right-hand sides b j .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It seems that that the most promising way to use Goldreich's generator to build a k-local PRG is to take a k-partite random hypergraph structure with the predicate P = XORAND t,k−t , where t = 1 Actually, in his theorem the constraints are not chosen with a tpartite structure, but rather simply as a random t-uniform hypergraph. However all that his Lasserre/Parrilo lower bound needs is that the hypergraph have a certain strong expansion property; he verifies the property holds with probability 1 − on(1) for a random t-uniform hypergraph, but it's easy to see the appropriate calculation also holds for a random t-partite hypergraph (assuming t is a constant). Alternatively, in our theorem instead of a k-partite structure we could have just a bipartite random hypergraph structure, with the "XOR variables" segregated from the Q-variables. and stretch n k/3 for k divisible by 3. If true, this would be optimal stretch in light of Theorem II.11.
In this work we have given two kinds of evidence supporting this conjecture for k = 5; we have shown security against all F 2 -linear attacks and against the Lasserre/Parrilo SDP hierarchy. We also extended the latter evidence to all larger values of k. A good open question that remains is to also extend the former evidence; i.e., to show that Goldreich's generator with P = XORAND t,k−t is -biased for = 1/n ω (1) when m = o(n t/2 ).
